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Art History & Criticism

On the Need for a Subsumptive Evaluative Approach;
Societal Evaluation and Devaluation of Art Works and Artistic Practice
Chair: H. Rafael Chacon
An ongoing axiological debate conceming the relative autonomy versus moral or
ethical responsibilify of art works and the art-making practice has, in recent years,
occupied significant space within the major aestfietic joumals. While the moralist
posits that a work of art’s value may be enhanced by the moral virtue that it exhibits,
the autonomist maintains that the work of art is valuable intrinsically. This
instrumentalist" versus autonomist debate inevitably ends in a stalemate, as the two
sides cannot come to a shared understanding of ‘aesttietic’ value.
This impasse renders both the instrumentalist and autonomist positions impotent in
terms of relevant artistic inquiry, and illustrates the need for an evaluative position
which can transcend categoric designations of the aesthetic and the operational. I will
argue for an evaluative position which is better poised to undertake issues relevant
to the continued existence of art in society today. I will refer to this evaluative stance
herein as the subsumptive" position, because of its implicit understanding that in
contemporary society, art must be defended and evaluated simultaneously on
social, political, and ethical- as well as on aesthetic- grounds.
The first section of this paper will establish the inadequacy of the current debate,
and will validate a "subsumptive" understanding of art and society. The subsumptive
position maintains that aesthetic, moral, political, and other concerns are inextricably
wound and must be evaluated comprehensively if art is ever to be accorded the
societal value ascribed to it by both the instrumentalist and the autonomist positions.
The second section will establish the subsumptive position"s relevance in
contemporary society. 1will address the contemporary era s expansion of visual
culture and blurring of disciplinary boundaries, and will discuss s^cific issues in need
of further investigation, including the artist/audience relationship, censorship, and
artistic responsibility. Finally, I will issue a call to artists, critics, and aesthetes to
consider a broad view of a work of art"s effects and merits in its evaluation or
defense.

II
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Introduction
An ongoing axiological debate concerning the relative autonomy versus
moral or ethical responsibility of art works and the art-making practice has, in
recent years, occupied significant space within the pages of the major aesthetic
journals. While the origins of this debate predate the advent of aesthetics as a
discipline, contemporary participants in this discussion frequently build upon
upon three foundational position papers;

Noel Carroll’s “Moderate Moralism”

(1996), Berys Gaut’s “The Ethical Criticism of Art” (1998), and James Anderson
and Jeff Dean’s “Moderate Autonomism” (1998), which serve to define the
moralist, ethicist, and autonomist positions respectively.^ Carroll and Gaut have
argued for the inclusion of moral or ethical considerations as a valid component
of aesthetic evaluation, while Anderson and Dean hold firmly that the moral and
the aesthetic must remain evaluatively as two distinct and separate realms.
This discussion has continued, in some form, in nearly each issue of The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism and The British Joumal of Aesthetics
since the mid 1990s.^

While certainly interesting and relevant new points are

argued with each new contribution, the underlying issue remains one of artistic
justification. That is, the moralist/ ethicist posits that a work of art’s value may be
enhanced by the moral virtue that the work of art exhibits, while the autonomist
maintains that the work of art is valuable intrinsically, and that this value is not
affected by moral virtue.
As Casey Haskins has argued in “Paradoxes of Autonomy: Or, Why
Won't the Problem of Artistic Justification Go Away?,” this ‘Instrumentalist’ versus
' Berys Gaut, T h e Ethical Criticism of Art," in Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection,
ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), originally delivered as part
of the 1994 American Society for Aesthetics national conference; Noel Carroll ‘ Moderate
Moralism,” The British Joume^ of Aesthetics 36, no. 3 (July 1996): 223-38; James Anderson and
Jeff Dean, “Moderate Autonomism,” The British Joumal of Aesthetics 38, no. 3 (April 1998):15067. I refer also to Noel Carroll’s “Moderate Moralism Versus Moderate Autonomism,” The British
Joumal of Aesthetics 38, no. 4 (October 1998): 419-24, in which Carroll offers as an answer to
Anderson and Dean’s “Moderate Autonomism.”
' The continuing discussion to which I refer, and its participants, shall be come clear within the
text of this paper.
1
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autonomist debate inevitably ends in a stalemate, as the two sides cannot come
to a shared philosophical understanding of the nature of the aesthetic'.^ The
instrumentalist, a term Haskins utilizes to encompass both Carroll’s moralist and
Gaut’s ethicist positions, believes that aesthetic value can be affected by
nonaesthetic or conformai concerns. The autonomist, meanwhile, will remain
steadfast in the assertion that aesthetic value is comprised solely and completely
of aesthetic or formal factors. Because a shared understanding of the nature of
aesthetic value cannot be reached, the debate never leaves the theoretical
sphere, and seems destined to continue without resolve ad infinitum.
This impasse renders both the instrumentalist and autonomist positions
impotent in terms of relevant artistic inquiry, and thereby illustrates the need for
an evaluative position which can transcend categoric designations of the
aesthetic and the operational. I will argue for an evaluative position which is
better poised to undertake issues relevant to the continued existence of art in
society today, for indeed the need for artistic justification has not gone away.

I

will refer to this evaluative stance herein as the ‘subsumptive’ position, because
of its implicit understanding that in contemporary society, art must be defended
and evaluated simultaneously on social, political, and etiiical- as well as on
aesthetic- grounds.
The subsumptive position does not insist that a work of art’s moral or
ethical merit can have a direct bearing on its aesthetic value. Neither, however,
does the subsumptive position legitimize pure’ aesthetic evaluation, as does the
autonomist position. Rather, the subsumptive position acknowledges the
systemic nature of human experience, and insists that art must be both evaluated
and defended as a facet of such experience. The subsumptive position thus
argues that the autonomist position is indefensible in the practical, societal
context. Furttiermore, while the subsumptive position acknowledges the
relevance of instrumental value, it argues that the instrumentalist position in its
current state is unable to adequately address issues facing the work of art in the
* Casey Haskins, “Paradoxes of Autonomy: Or, Why Won’t the Problem of Artistic Justification
Go Away?,” The Joumal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56, no. 1 (winter 2000):1-22.
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practical world.
The first section of this paper will establish the inadequacy of the
autonomist position and the ineffectiveness of the instrumentalist position in its
current form, and will validate a comprehensive- or subsumptive - understanding
of art and society. I will show that a purely utilitarian view of artistic value will not
satisfy society’s expectations for art’, whiie ciaims for art’s intrinsic value will not
adequately defend its continued existence in the current political and social
climate. The subsumptive position maintains that aesthetic, moral, political, and
other concerns are inextricably wound in practical experience and, as such, must
be evaluated comprehensively if art is ever to be accorded the societal value
ascribed to it by both the instrumentalist and the autonomist positions.
The second section will establish the subsumptive position’s relevance in
contemporary society. 1will address the contemporary era’s expansion of visual
culture and blurring of disciplinary boundaries, and will discuss specific issues in
need of further investigation, including the artist/ audience relationship,
censorship, and artistic responsibility. Finally, I will issue a call to artists, critics,
and aesthetes to consider a broad view of a work of art’s effects and merits in its
evaluation or defense. This will include an identification of certain strengths in
various modes of contemporary visual communication as well as a
recommendation for change in regard to certain practices which do not
effectively meet the practical challenges defined herein.
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Section I: The Need for a Subsumptive Evaluative Approach
The Impasse of the Instrumental & Autonomist Positions
In order to effectively argue the need for a comprehensive understanding
of art and society, It will first be necessary to elaborate further on the current
instrumentalist versus autonomist discussion, Including a thorough description of
the tenets of each position/ Haskins has called the quarrel over artistic
justification a longstanding humanist problem,^ and Indeed the discussion did not
begin with nor Is It limited to the ideas put forth by Gaut, Carroll, or Anderson and
Dean. For the purposes of this argument, however, I will rely chiefly on the
current discussion outlined above, which centers on the effects of moral or
ethical factors on aesthetic value.
It Is worthy of notice that both Carroll and Anderson and Dean modify their
respective positions with the term moderate'. If we view this In relation to the
‘radical’ position, the moderate view Is Indeed far more sensible In terms of
shared understanding between the Instrumentalist and the autonomist and In
terms of the subsumptive position.
In the view of the radical autonomist, moral or ethical evaluation of art Is
never appropriate. Radical autonomism holds that art Is a strictly autonomous
realm of practice, distinct from all other social realms. To the radical autonomist,
the evaluation of art In moral, ethical, or political terms Is Incoherent. As such,
the Introduction of moral or political Ideas for the purpose of artistic evaluation

* Like Haskins, I will use the term ‘instrumentalist’ when referring jointly to Carroll’s moralist and
Gaut’s ethicist positions. I do so with caution, however, as the term can negatively tie associated
with propaganda or mere utility. I do not wish to imply that Carroll or Gaut would reduce art’ to a
purely sociological function; both take pains to illustrate the opposite. I use the term here simply
for ease of syntax.
* Haskins, p.1

4
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presents an incoherent and inappropriate evaluative dilem ma/
The radical moralist, meanwhile, holds that moral value is the only
criterion of aesthetic value. Oliver Connolly has further distinguished between
two views of the radical moralist position: the ‘narrow’ view of radical moralism
holds that formal criteria have no role in determining aesthetic value, while the
slightly less limiting broad' view maintains that all formal criteria are deeply
morally significant.^ In each instance, the radical moralist submits that moral
value must be the primary consideration in the evaluation of art.^
The distinction between the radical" positions and the "moderate" views
claimed by Carroll and Anderson and Dean, then, becomes significant. The
moderate autonomist position, to which Anderson and Dean subscribe, states
that autonomy is granted only to the aesthetic dimension of a work of art. Unlike
the radical autonomist, the moderate autonomist will concede that a work of art
may have moral or political value. The moderate autonomist holds that a work of
art may be evaluated both morally and aesthetically, but such evaluations are
distinct and have no bearing on one another. That is, while the moderate
autonomist will acknowledge the nonaesthetic values of a work of art, these
nonaesthetic values are not relevant to aesthetic valuation; a work of art will
never be aesthetically improved by its moral strengths nor aesthetically devalued
by its moral shortcomings. For ease of discussion, I will refer to this moderate
view herein as the autonomist position".
The moderate moralist position with which Carroll identifies, meanwhile.
* Carroll suggests Clive Bell as an exemplar radical formalist, justified through Bell's insistence
that formal qualities alone determine aesthetic merit. Bell does acknowledge the existence of
non-formal values, but maintains that these values have no bearing upon the work of art qua art:
"Let no one imagine that representation is bad in itself; a realistic form may be as significant, in its
place as part of the design, as an abstract. But if a representative form has value, it is as form,
not as representation. The representative element in a work of art may or may not be harmful;
always it is irrelevant. For, to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing from life, no
knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions. Art transports us from the
world of man's activity to a world of aesthetic exaltation.” [Bell, Art. London: Chatto & Windus,
1921, p. 25.]
^Oliver Connolly, “Ethicism and Moderate Moralism," The British Joumal of Aesthetics 40, no. 3
(July 2000):302-316.
' Plato may similarly be regarded as the exemplar radical moralist, through his assertion that art
should only be discussed in terms of its contribution or role in moral life.

5
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contends that “for certain genres [of art], moral comment, along with formal
comment. Is natural and appropriate.”® Unlike the radical moralist, who holds
either that formal criteria lack any significance In aesthetic evaluation or that all
formal criteria have moral significance, the moderate moralist will acknowledge
that some works of art have no moral dimension. Furthermore, Carroll will
submit that moral considerations do not trump all other evaluative factors. A
work of art which exhibits a moral flaw will not necessarily be deemed
aesthetically Inadequate; If formal and other criteria are strong enough to
establish a work's value despite a moral shortcoming, the work will retain
aesthetic value. Likewise, a work whidi exhibits a ‘correct’ moral viewpoint will
not necessarily be deemed aesthetically valuable; formal criteria viewed In
conjunction with moral criteria will establish the relative aesthetic value of a work
of art. Again, for unity and ease of discussion, I will refer to this moderate
moralist view as the ‘moralist position’.
The Impact of utilizing the moderate rather than radical positions In the
moralist versus autonomist debate Is readily apparent. Both the moderate
moralist and autonomist will acknowledge a multiplicity of values In the evaluation
of art, creating a seemingly fertile ground for debate. However, the ultimate
futility of the debate In Its current form can be detected at this early stage as well.
While the moralist supports a composite evaluation of a work of art’s various
attributes In determining the work’s aesthetic success, the autonomist resolutely
separates formal from moral and other values, and maintains that no relation
exists among such values.
The ethicist position, as defined by Gaut, bears a strong resemblance to
Carroll’s moralist position, and as such I have allied the ethicist and moralist
positions In the debate with that of the autonomist. The ethicist position Is slightly
stronger than the moralist in tone. While the moralist holds that a moral defect
may contribute to a devaluation of the work of art, the ethicist claims that an
ethical defect will constitute an aesthetic defect. Gaut submits that If a work of
art displays an ethically reprehensible attitude, the work Is to that extent
•Carroll, “Moderate Moralism" p. 226
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aesthetically defective, while if the work exhibits an ethically meritorious attitude,
the work is to that extent aesthetically valuable. Like Carroll, Gaut acknowledges
a plurality of aesthetic values, and holds that an ethical value or demerit is not
singularly sufficient for a similar aesthetic valuation of the work as a whole. The
ethical, Gaut states, is one aspect of the aesthetic. The autonomist, of course,
differs from the moralist and ethicist in the belief that moral, ethical, and other
values are distinct from aesthetic value, and that as such any discussion of
aesthetic value which includes nonformal concerns is incoherent and
inappropriate.
The instrumentalist position’s claim that a moral/ ethical virtue or flaw can
constitute an aesthetic virtue or flaw is based fundamentally on what Gaut refers
to as the prescribed response’ of a work of art. According to Gaut, a work of art
directs its viewer toward a specific response; this response may be emotional,
physical, or perceptual. The direction by a work of art toward such an experience
constitutes the work’s ‘prescription’, and the specific experience constitutes the
work’s prescribed response." Both the ethicist and moralist positions hold that
the response prescribed by a work of art may be either ethical/ moral or
unethical/ immoral, and as such may affect the overall aesthetic success of the
work.
Gaut and Carroll argue that if the response prescribed through a work of
art is morally or ethically incongruent, the work will fail to elicit the prescribed
response. That is, if the audience response prescribed through a work of art is
morally unacceptable to the audience, then the audience will not respond in the
way prescribed by the work of art. Gaut refers to this incongruity in terms of
‘merit’; if the responses prescribed by a work of art are unmerited because they
are unethical, the audience will have reason not to respond in the way prescribed
by the work. Thus, says Gaut, the prescription of an unmerited response will
result in the failure of that response. As the response is necessary to the
aesthetic success of the work, the failure of the prescribed response will
constitute an aesthetic failure. Carroll calls this failure of the prescribed response
For a complete discussion of the work of art’s ‘prescribed response,' see Gaut pp. 192-199.

7
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a failure of the work on Its own terms, and holds that the work’s power to effect
its intended aesthetic experience will be hindered.
Gaut makes clear, however, that the representation of an unethical
element does not in itself constitute grounds for aesthetic failure. An important
distinction of the ethicist position lies in what Gaut refers to as a work’s ‘attitude’,
which can be determined through critical evaluation. A work’s attitude is
manifested in its prescribed responses; a composite view of a work’s prescribed
responses will yield the work’s attitude. Thus, the representation of Satan in
Milton’s writings does not make Milton a Satanist; Milton’s attitude toward Satan
is disapproving. Works can be effective because they violate ethical sensibility, if
the success of the work requires the viewer’s disapproval. Other worics may offer
an approving attitude toward an unethical element, and will encounter an
aesthetic failure when the audience fails to respond in the intended manner.
Furthermore, if a prescribed response or attitude is merited but ineffective, an
aesthetic failure still occurs.
Prescribed responses, therefore, must be considered in composite, as a
single prescribed response considered alone may give an incorrect
understanding of the work’s overall attitude. The attitude displayed in a work,
and not its subject matter, is paramount." Nonetheless, it is important to recall
that to the ethicist, the relative merit of a work’s attitude will not singularly
determine aesthetic worth. The ethicist position merely claims, as Gaut states,
that “Whether prescribed responses are merited is aesthetically relevant, and
among the criteria that are relevant to determining whether they are merited are
ethical ones.”’® The ethicist holds that a work may be aesthetically valuable
even if ethically depraved based on the strength of its formal qualities, assuming
these formal elements are strong enough to salvage the value diminished by the
ethical shortcoming.
Anderson and Dean, as proponents of the autonomist position, counter
that an understanding of moral and aesthetic criticisms as distinct will be helpful
” Gaut, p. 188
" Ibid. p. 197
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when confronted with conflicts between the criteria. Anderson and Dean point to
works In which moral values predominate for some audience members while
aesthetic values predominate for others. The novel Huckleberry Finn, for
Instance, Is constantly embattled. Certain readers feel that the work’s overall
aesthetic merit surpasses concerns of racist undertones found within the text,
while others feel the book should be removed from school libraries on moral
grounds. To the autonomist, these conflicts exist outside of the aesthetic
domain.
The Initial constrictive disagreement between the instrumentalist and the
autonomist positions, then. Is one of categoric Inclusion. The Instrumentalist
holds that aesthetic value Is comprised of a multiplicity of values, including
formal, moral or ethical, and otherwise. The autonomist believes, however, that
while moral or ethical considerations may be worthy of Independent evaluation,
they are not to be Included In aesthetic evaluation. The autonomist and
Instrumentalist positions have failed to reach a shared conceptual definition of
the aesthetic domain. The debate In Its current form can thus proceed no further,
and continues endlessly Into what Haskins has called “dialectical oblivion.’’^®
Whether a given value found within a work of art Is, in nature, ultimately
aesthetic or otherwise Is really of limited consequence to a comprehensive
evaluation of the work In practical terms. The subsumptive position may perhaps
be thought of as a ‘practical aesthetics," In the same way that practical ethics
concerns the application and Implications of ethical principles in the physical
world. A practical aesthetics makes use of the instrumentalist and autonomist
positions’ observations about the various values of art, while disregarding
designations of such values as aesthetic or nonaesthetic. The subsumptive
position, while acknowledging the significance of the theoretical debate’s
observations, Is concerned with the application of and Implications for the work of
art In the societal context.

" Haskins, p. 3
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The Inadequacies of intrinsic Value
Despite the apparent quagmire created by this discussion of aesthetic
categorization or inclusion, the debate is not merely semantic. While the
language of the current debate inevitably returns to definitions of the aesthetic
domain, each position does offer a tangible view of art’s societal role. According
to the instrumentalist position, in the same way that a work of art may exhibit
appropriate or inappropriate moral or ethical attitudes, the work of art can
advance or pervert moral or ethical understanding. Meanwhile, the autonomist
position’s defense of aesthetic value as an independent category rests on a
notion of aesthetic sanctity. That is, the autonomist holds art to be intrinsically
valuable, and thereby believes that an evaluation of a work of art which includes
its instrumental use ineluctably violates the work’s intrinsic value.
In order to fully establish the validity of the subsumptive position, it will
also be necessary to demonstrate the inadequacies of both the autonomist and
instrumentalist positions in terms of art’s societal context. The aesthetic
experience’ plays a central role in the autonomist’s argument, and appears in the
instrumentalist position as well. The aesthetic experience, the autonomist
maintains, is singularly constitutive of the work of art. That is, the aesthetic
experience offered through an encounter with a work of art is unique and
significant; a work which offers no aesthetic experience is not successful as a
work of art.’^ The instrumentalist, of course, counters that the aesthetic
experience encountered through a work of art is affected by moral or ethical
factors.
The autonomist position equates the aesthetic experience with a state of
‘absorption’. That is, an aesthetic experience is encountered through a work of
art when the formal qualities of the work are strong enough so as to completely
hold the viewer’s attention, or to absorb. The autonomist will not acknowledge
" For a further discussion of the aesthetic experience’ and its centrality in formalist theory, see
Jeffrey Petts, “Aesthetic Experience and the Revelation of Value,” The Joumal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism 56, no. 1(winter 1998), derived in part and biased upon John Dewey, Art As
Experience (New York: Perigee Books, 1980).
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cognitive or other nonformal values as part of the aesthetic; as such it may be
assumed that the autonomist identifies an aesthetic experience intuitively.
Jeffrey Petts, in his essay “Aesthetic Experience and the Revelation of Value,”
counters the autonomist's intuitive approach with his assertion that the aesthetic
experience must involve “specifiable intellectual content.”'^ If the aesthetic
experience could be described merely through a feeling of rightness', says Petts,
then intensity of emotion could simply serve as the gauge of aesthetic value. To
limit the aesthetic experience to an experience of beauty' is similarly inadequate.
The expressive power or cognitive insight found in a work contribute to the
aesthetic experience of the work, which as Gaut explains, is why masterful works
of art may be brutally ugly.'®
While Petts' claim may appear to boost the instrumentalist argument, he
has not established any need for the inclusion of moral, ethical, or other factors in
an aesthetic designation per se. Rather, he has established that a ‘pure'
aesthetic experience cannot be practically separated from a cognitive or
expressive experience encountered through the work of art. The work of art is
experienced by the viewer in composite; that is, all experiences offered through
the work of art are encountered by the viewer at the same moment. Without a
careful and methodical investigation, the viewer will not be able to practically
distinguish among a purely' aesthetic experience and a cognitive or other
experience encountered in unison. Petts states:
aesthetic experience is neither a trivial (and possibly expendable) ‘felt response’
nor a critical approach’ to art (or to anything else for that matter), but is an
experience that accompanies and marks a job that has been well done, a
problem that has been solved, a work of art that is beautiful, where animal life
(that is, life characterized by a biological constitution and by the need to adapt to
a changing environment, achieved through the sensory detection of one's
environment, and the capability of motion) is a precondition of such experience."

While certainly the autonomist will object to Petts' utilitarian conception of
the aesthetic experience, the real point of interest here is his acknowledgment of
the active viewer. Petts illustrates that the aesthetic experience can only exist in
"Petts, pp. 61-71.
"G aut, p. 185
" Petts, p. 63
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the presence of animal life. Clearly, if the aesthetic experience offered by a work
of art can only be discussed in terms of its effects on animal (human) viewers,
then a practical understanding of the effects of such an experience in the human
sphere is valid and appropriate. This lends credence to the need for a
subsumptive position. While the standing instrumentalist and autonomist debate
culminates in a disagreement over the relative merits of aesthetic versus
cognitive experiences in the theoretical realm, the subsumptive position
acknowledges that such experiences can only exist within the physical world.
The subsumptive position undertakes an investigation of the effects of and
implications for the work of art in the practical, or human, world.
The autonomist argues that to view a work of art in terms of moral
education damages its integrity. This position holds that art is intrinsically
valuable and therefore should not be bound to external purposes, such as moral
education. The argument, as Haskins has rephrased it, holds that artworks do
any number of things, but what they do is not what makes them art. Anderson
and Dean state that art’s design, and not its content, hold our attention; to subject
the work of art to utilitarian criteria for evaluation confuses art’s intrinsic- or
aesthetic - qualities with external valuations.
The ‘intrinsic value’ of art is the essential tenet of the autonomist position;
phrases such as “art for art’s sake” or “the work of art qua work of art” assume
that art is inherently valuable. Intrinsic value, the autonomist holds, exists in the
very nature of art, whereas instrumental value necessarily refers to an outside
interest. Malcolm Budd has asserted that art’s intrinsic value is directly linked to
the experience the work of art offers, or the ‘aesthetic experience’ discussed
earlier. = Says Budd, the value of such an experience is not instrumental. Thus,
the work of art which fails to move or inspire lacks only instrumental value; its
intrinsic value is not diminished. In true moderate autonomist form, Budd asserts
that aesthetic values are not necessarily more important than cognitive or moral
values, but are distinct.
'• Budd’s theories are referred to by Haskins, p. 4, and are drawn from Malcolm Budd, Values of
Art: Pictures, Poetry, and Mus/c (London: Penguin Books, 1995).
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The need for a subsumptive position In light of the intrinsic value argument
can be defended on two points. First, as Petts has demonstrated, the aesthetic
experience does not exist without the presence of a human participant. If, as
Budd maintains, the work of art is valuable by virtue of the aesthetic experience it
offers, then the value of the work of art cannot exist without the presence of an
audience. Art’s intrinsic’ value, it appears, can only be discussed in relation to
its human effects.
My second point of defense requires a more thorough understanding of
the nature of ‘intrinsic value’; for this, I shall refer to John O’Neill’s “The Varieties
of Intrinsic Value.”’® O’Neill identifies three conceptions of value which are
typically termed ‘intrinsic’; 1. non-instrumental value, 2. value by virtue of
intrinsic, or non-relational, properties, and 3. objective value. Each successive
conception is slightly stronger than its predecessor. Although O’Neill discusses
these points generally I shall refer to them as they apply to the work of art. The
first definition of intrinsic value is non-instrumental’ value, which holds merely
that art is an end in itself. That is, art need not serve any function; it is valuable
simply by virtue of its existence. The second type O ’Neill offers is a value based
on intrinsic or non-relational properties. To apply this type of intrinsic value to art
would require that art be valuable without relation or reference to human
experience. Finally, objective value requires that art’s defense not be dependent
on human designations of value.
O ’Neill submits that while the non-instrumental defense of a given entity’s
intrinsic value (in this case, art’s intrinsic value) is common, it may be necessary
to defend such a position in terms of non-relational and objective value as well.
That is, a claim for a work’s non-instrumental value may not hold up under
scrutiny if similar claims cannot be made for the work’s non-relational and
objective values. The reasoning behind such an argument is as follows: an
entity may be defended non-instrumentally merely through the claim that the
entity does not serve any human function. However, true non-instrumentality can
only be assured when no reference to human experience is required. Further
John O ’Neill, “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," The Monist75, no. 2(April 1992);119-37.
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still, non-instrumentality cannot be convincingly demonstrated If the entity being
defended requires a human designation of value.
The first or non-instrumental conception of intrinsic value, as can be seen
in the autonomist’s argument, poses no great challenge to the work of art. The
second, or non-relational, and third, or objective, varieties prove more difficult.
Clearly art cannot be deemed valuable without relation to human experience
because the work of art was itself created through a human act. Its very
existence is relative to human experience. The argument for art's objective
independence from human valuation may be made, but will encounter strong
reservations. Certainly human valuations were involved in the creation of a work
of art, making the work’s post partum autonomy an unlikely eventuality.
O ’Neill asserts that true intrinsic value must be determined through an
evaluation of an entity’s ‘real’ properties, though he distinguishes among two
definitions of a real property:
(1) A real property is one that exists In the absence of any being experiencing
that object. (Weak interpretation.)
(2) A real property is one that can be characterized without references to the
experiences of a being who might experience the object. (Strong interpretation. )“

The ‘aesthetic experience’ may meet the qualifications of O’Neill’s first, or weak,
definition of a real property but not without some difficulty. It could be argued
that a work of art might continue to exist in its current form even if it were placed
in a closet and never seen again. This situation bears a remarkable
resemblance to the cliched Zen koan, “If a tree falls in a forest, and there is no
one present to hear, does it make a sound?” Transposed for our purposes, the
question might be, “If a work of art is never seen again, does it still produce an
aesthetic response?’ Thus, for the work of a r t, the possibility of the aesthetic
experience as a real property could be argued, but weakly.
O ’Neill’s second, or strong, position simply cannot be fulfilled by the
aesthetic experience. We cannot discuss the aesthetic experience without
reference to human experience. The aesthetic experience, then, cannot be
“ O ’Neill, p. 126
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included among art’s ‘real’ properties, and therefore cannot t)e used to support
art’s intrinsic value.
In this regard, the subsumptive position supports the instrumentalist
position’s claim for the instrumental nature of art. The instrumentalist holds that
art is valued or devalued by virtue of its instrumental contributions. Both the
subsumptive and the instrumentalist positions, then, advocate for the
consideration of moral, ethical, and other cognitive values in the evaluation of
works of art. The subsumptive position will take this instrumentalist view a step
further, however, by asserting that not only instrumental values but
instrumentality itself must be considered in a comprehensive practical evaluation
of art. This acknowledges that as the work of art does exist exclusively within
the human sphere, its instrumental use is inevitable. Not only the values used
instrumentally- moral, ethical or otherwise- but the manner of instrumental use is
available for evaluative comment. I shall return to this point in greater detail in
the second section of this paper.
Meanwhile, another point relevant to the subsumptive position can be
gleaned from O ’Neill’s argument. In his discussion concerning the intrinsic value
of ‘nature’- or the natural environment, O’Neill offers a notable insight: the
argument for nature’s intrinsic value can be compellingly made in terms of non
instrumental, non-relational, and objective value, but is still insufficient to
guarantee its preservation. That is, nature’s value meets the earlier-defined
requirements of intrinsic value, but this assured intrinsic value will not necessarily
protect it from human abuse. In order to effectively alter the treatment of nature,
we must also demonstrate that it is in human society’s best interest to protect the
natural environment.
This observation can similarly be applied to the protection of art and
artistic practice. O ’Neill’s allegation concerning the protection of nature
illuminates the challenge facing the work of art in the societal context. That is, in
order to protect the right to existence of the work of art and artistic practice, we
must demonstrate that the presence of art is beneficial to society.
15
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This, precisely, Illustrates the need for the subsumptive position. Even If
the Intrinsic value of art can be established, a demonstration of art’s societal
value may still be necessary to protect It from societal constraints. In the
practical realm, this assertion deems the autonomist position Irrelevant. The
Instrumentalist position Is better positioned to defend art in terms of societal
benefit, but the moral or ethical values ascribed to works of art under the
Instrumentalist position will similarly prove Inadequate to a practical societal
acknowledgment of art’s worth. The subsumptive position Is better poised to
demonstrate such societal artistic worth because the subsumptive position
evaluates comprehensively the effects of and Implications for the work of art In
the societal context.

The Need for an Expanded View of Artistic Worth
According to the Instrumentalist position, art has the ability to advance
moral understanding. The autonomist will, of course, reply that we learn nothing
new from a rt- that moral education Is not affected by the aesthetic element. As
the autonomist critic Clement Greenberg has said, “I have never really felt that
morality should In any sense be affected by the aesthetic factor. That’s an
absolute separation... I don’t see art as having ever, In a real sense, affected the
course of human affairs.”^ To the autonomist’s charge that we learn nothing
new from art, the Instrumentalist answers that not all education comes In the form
of new knowledge. Carroll holds that artworks activate preexisting moral
knowledge In the audience. He submits, “It Is an error to suppose that moral
education only occurs when new moral emotions or tenets are communicated.
Gaut concurs, and offers that Indeed much of art’s value is derived from
affectlve-cognltlon’. That Is, art offers us new conceptions of the world, by
making our already possessed knowledge “vividly present, so disposing us to
Greenberg’s remark was quoted In the same œntext by Haskins, p. 2, and was originally
drawn from a discussion with T.J. Clark In Modernism and Modernity: The Vanœuver Conference
Papers, ed. Benjamin H.D. Buchloh et. al. (Halifax: Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1983):
90.
“ Carroll, “Moderate Moralism,” p. 226
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reorder our thoughts.”®
In order to assess these arguments, it Is necessary to understand more
comprehensively the values ascribed to art In the societal context. This will
demonstrate that our society values art for Its original contributions to knowledge,
moral and otherwise. In this regard, the Instrumentalist position Is validated.
However, It will simultaneously be shown that our society allows aesthetic factors
to Inform Its moral opinions, and that these opinions do have an explicit effect on
art’s continued societal role. The theoretical debate between the autonomist and
Instrumentalist positions cannot adequately encompass the challenges facing art
and artistic practice In the physical world, thus providing further validation for the
subsumptive position.
First, I would like to take up the problem of artistic contributions to human
knowledge. As a discipline, and In terms of contributions to human
understanding, science enjoys a great deal of societal enthusiasm due to Its
perceived verity. To the scientist, art does not so much acquire new knowledge
of the world as express It In socially novel ways. Sigmund Freud dismisses art
for the sake of science, because unlike science, art “never dares to make any
attacks on the realm of reality.”^

The understanding here Is that artists merely

rearrange, albeit In visually stimulating ways, Information which has t)een
previously established, usually through scientific Investigation.
Donald Kuspit, In his provocative essay “Artist Envy,” cites Heinz Kohut’s
slightly more art-afflrming ’hypothesis of artistic anticipation,’ which credits the
artist with being “ahead of his time In focusing on the nuclear psychological
problems of his era.”®

Kohut maintains, however, that the scientist eventually

comes to an empirical understanding of what the artist merely Intuits. According
“ Gaut, p. 195
“ Freud’s views on art and science are here referenced as cited by Donald Kuspit, “Artist
Envy,” in Postmodern Perspectives: Issues in Contemporary Art, ed. by Howard Risatti.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990:290-99. The original sourœ comes from Sigmund
Freud, New introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1933: p. 219.
“ Kuspit, p. 296; derived from Heinz Kohut, The Restoration of the Self, New York: International
University Press, 1977:p. 285-86
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to Kohut, the artist sets critical new ideas in motion, but these ideas remain
incomplete until the scientist arrives at substantiation. Kohut’s model places the
artist as a kind of harbinger of future knowledge. While this acknowledges art’s
inquisitive or investigative nature, it seems to affirm the autonomist position’s
assertion that art cannot contribute directly to moral education.
Nelson Goodman, in his discussions of art and science, acknowledged
that art and science are not cognitively equivalent, however, recognized that “the
arts must be taken no less seriously than the sciences as modes of discovery,
creation, and enlargement of knowledge in the broad sense of advancement of
the understanding.”*

Indeed, art and science play two distinct investigative

roles. While both seek truths in some sense, the range of permissible truths is
more precisely delimited in science than in art. As Catherine Elgin points out,
science does not seek every truth.^ There are a myriad of truths about our
world which science deems irrelevant or trivial. Science does not investigate the
number of dandelions in a lawn, for instance, because the fact is not applicable
to any larger understanding of the world. Artistic practice and dialogue, on the
other hand, make use of truths uncompelling to the scientist and investigate the
ways such truths interact with one another to inform our world view.
Furthermore, any given scientific experiment seeks answers to a narrowly
specified group of questions. Art allows for a multiplicity of truisms.
Elgin notes that the artistic pursuit of truth holds several key advantages
over the scientific, namely interpretation and enduring interest. She cites
Shakespeare’s Henry V'by way of example, and finds that in interpreting the
work, we may view it as a story about morality, about war, about leadership,
about Shakespearean England, or in various other lights, either separately or
intertwined. She further submits that this complexity of interpretation allows the
work to maintain enduring interest, unlike an investigated scientific principle,
which once established, loses its general interest as it is absorbed into the
“ Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978) p. 102
” Catherine Eigin, “Reorienting Aesthetics, Recovering Cognition,” The Joumal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism ^, no. 3 (summer 2000) pp. 219-25
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compendium of human knowledge. As Elgin eloquently summarizes, “Where
reference is multiple or complex, interpretation is not straightforward.”®
Goodman’s five symptoms of the aesthetic’ offer further understanding of
art’s advantages over science. These ‘essential ingredients’, according to
Goodman, include: 1. syntactic density- that is, with the slightest difference in line
between two symbols the symbol is altered; 2. semantic density- that the system
(in this case, work of art) is able to represent the most minute of contextual
differences between things; 3. relative repleteness- the ability of a work of art to
symbolize or effect meaning on multiple levels, as in the Henry t/example; 4.
exemplification- that a given representation may exemplify, and thus refer to key
features of, other things or ideas; and 5. multiple and complex reference- that
symbols may perform a variety of referential roles, and in limitless combination
with other symbols, identify an infinite number of possibilities.®
According to Goodman, an exemplar is a “telling instance,” which
rearranges and highlights certain features of our world which may otherwise go
unnoticed, thereby enhancing familiarity with a given circumstance. This places
art in the powerful position of being able to exact societal notice, and thus opens
the potential for effected societal influence. Repleteness allows for a view of a
larger picture’ seldom offered through the sciences, which typically achieve a
relative repleteness only when viewed in composite. That is, while a multitude of
scientific experiment results and findings must be held together to offer an
understanding of multiple aspects of a given situation, a work of art allows,
through multiplicity of reference, for this same understanding to be achieved in a
glance.
Elgin builds a strong case for the value of the aesthetic as defined by
Goodman in terms of education and human development: while semantic and
syntactic density allow for “limitless precision,” they invite indecision. Certainly,
not all distinctions are worthy of notice, and triviality can plague art as much as
science. Through contact with the arts we develop a discriminating ability to
” Elgin, p. 224
* Goodman, pp. 67-68
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differentiate between those things worttiy of our attentions and the merely trivial,
or disœrnment Furthermore, says Elgin, we learn to heighten our sensitivity to
significance and thus “expand our cognitive range.”*

She summarizes, “The

acuity promoted by encounters with the arts is a wide-ranging ability to recognize
sameness and difference, pattern and variation, at different levels of
abstraction.”®’
Elgin thus acknowledges art’s potential contributions to human knowledge,
and demonstrates that some truths are more readily contributed through art than
through science. This appears to validate the instrumentalist position’s argument
for moral education, though Elgin makes no claims for the effects of moral value
on aesthetic value per se. Nonetheless, art’s contributions to moral
understanding will not be enough to justify its continued existence. That is, while
an encounter with a work of art may promote enhanced factual, perceptual, or
moral understanding, this gained knowledge will not adequately fulfill societal
expectations for art. Elgin goes on to say:
Works of art can express things other than emotions, and works can express emotions
they do not evoke. Nonetheless, it is clear that many works of art evoke emotions, and
that their doing so is vital to their aesthetic function. Goodman neither denies nor belittles
this point. What he denies is that the evocation of emotion is the end of art. A kick in the
shins is a far more efficient way of evoking pain than composing a sonnet is. If a poet
wants merely to evoke pain, he should eschew poetry and take up mayhem. Rather than
the end of art, Goodman contends, the evocation of emotions Is a powerful, sometimes
subtle means by which some works of art advance understanding.”

Moral understanding, as Goodman and Elgin contend, can be enhanced
through encounters with art. However, there may be more effective means of
advancing such moral understanding. Art, then, cannot be compellingly
defended solely by virtue of its moral contributions. The autonomist refers to this
as the argument from irreplaceability’: if an artwork is valued because it performs
function f, and function f can also be performed satisfactorily by a social service
organization, then art loses its distinctive identity.* In the same way that intrinsic
“ Elgin, p. 221
” Ibid.
” Ibid.,
iDia., p. 223
As explained by Haskins, pp. 2-3
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value will not assure art’s continued protection and esteem, instrumental
contributions (in this case, in the form of moral education) will never define art’s
unique significance. While aesthetic and Instrumental values may be understood
as two distinct valuative domains, it is critical that the instrumental and aesthetic
values of a work of art be evaluated subsumptively in order to ascertain its
societal worth.
While instrumental value cannot define art, as a society we do value new
contributions to human knowledge, and these original contributions must be
included in a compelling evaluation or defense of art. Ross Bowden builds a
case for an informative’ aesthetic in his anthropological assessment of art and
forgery.^ Bowden, whose primary research lies with the culture of the Kwoma
people of Papua New Guinea, distinguishes between the value placed on
originality of ideas in Kwoma society versus in Western society. To the Kwoma,
the name of the creator of a ritual or art object is insignificant. This is because,
Bowden argues, the whole of human knowledge and understanding is believed to
have had a divine origin. Thus, the artist’ is adding nothing new to the
knowledge bank, but is simply recreating an object based on an earlier model,
whose existence was at some point in time divinely created. On the other hand,
knowledge in the Western world is largely believed to be built upon the
achievements of earlier humans. Thus, Bowden argues, in the Western world
works of art which contribute the most to a further understanding of our world are
ranked aesthetically highest.®
Bowden offers an examination of the value our culture places on original
works of art and on art forgeries as further testament to the necessity of original
contribution. This argument begins with a question: Why should a work of art
once thought to be an original masterpiece be devalued when it is discovered to
be a forgery? Clearly, the aesthetic or visual aspects of the work remain intact.
If the forgery is good enough to have been exhibited in a museum, the visual
Ross Bowden, “What is Wrong with an Art Forgery?: An Anthropological Perspective,” The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 57, no. 3(summer 1999): 333-43.
“ Ibid., p. 337
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distinctions between the forgery and the original are likely to be insignificant. The
potential to evoke emotion remains intact as well. However, “Forgeries are
disvalued, says [Bowden, paraphrasing Alfred Lessing], not because they lack
aesthetic merit but because they lack one of the defining features of art, notably
creativity.”*
There is a perhaps unfortunate tendency among cultural critics to equate
novelty with triviality. Certainly, newness alone does not indicate significance.
However, as a culture, Westerners do exhibit a sense of appreciation for the
individual who first contributes a given piece of information to the social
compendium of knowledge. As Bowden points out, this is demonstrated in our
selection of recipients for the Nobel Prize. At least in theory, we offer the prize to
the contributor(s) who first achieved a certain feat, and not to those who emulate
it, no matter how successfully. Says Bowden, “Forgeries are disvalued not just
because they involve deception but b>ecause they contribute nothing new to
knowledge.”®^
Arthur Danto and Mark Sago# point out that whereas the painter of an
original takes a given set of stimuli and paints a representation of these
processed ideas, the painter of a replica merely paints a painting.* Our culture
values the original as an insightful and articulate contribution presented to society
by an individual artist. The forgery, meanwhile, is devalued not for its aesthetic
qualities per se but for its apparent lack of intelligence and insight. Art is
appreciated not so much for what it depicts as for what it reveals.
This ‘revelatory’ element, according to Hanna Segal, is integral to
aesthetic appreciation. Nonetheless, as the instrumentalist position earlier
argued, revelation can be inherently a discovery, rather than an invention, of
truth. Segal says.
* Bowden, p. 334
Ibid.. p. 337
* This discussed by John Bohn, “Museums and the Culture of Autography,” The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Critidsm 57, no. 1 (winter 1999) p. 60 and originally derived from Arthur
Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press,
1981 and Mark Sagoff, “The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries,” The Joumal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 35(W 76): 169-180.

22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

There is often a feeling, both in the artist and in the recipient, that the artist not so much
creates but reveals a reality. It has been said that nobody noticed the mists on the
Thames until Turner painted them. If a painting is of a landscape known to us we feel
that aspects, features, feelings have been revealed which we never noticed before.”

Clearly, as a culture we value new Information or attention to existing
information brought to light through an encounter with art. Our society
acknowledges that original works of art can offer valuable and unique
contributions to collective human knowledge and understanding. Nonetheless,
originality and instrumental contributions to knowledge as well as formal or
aesthetic merit will need to be considered conjointly in order to defend a work of
art or artistic practice itself as being of benefit to society. This again
demonstrates the fruitlessness of the current autonomist versus instrumentalist
debate, which is bound in theoretical definitions of the aesthetic', and elucidates
the need for an evaluative position which subsumptively considers art’s
instrumental contributions along with other explicit and contextual factors.
Finally, while as a culture we acknowledge the potential for valuable
artistic contributions, the inverse is that such valuations are not always positive.
In order to effectively defend art's existence against practical, societal
challenges, it is necessary to understand the bases for such challenges. Once
again, a subsumptive consideration of aesthetic, instrumental and other factors is
essential to an effective evaluation of art in the societal context. I will
demonstrate that our society frequently intermingles aesthetic and moral
judgments, and that such judgments have a real effect on the work of art and on
artistic practice.
It is in this arena where Mark Packer's work deserves notice.*” Packer
has made a convincing argument, picked up by Marcia Muelder Eaton, that
aesthetics and morality or ethics cannot always be definitively separated. He
offers several hypothetical accounts of situations in which specific conducts are
” Hanna Seggd, Dream, Phantasy, and Art London and New York: Tavistock/ Routledge,
1991:94-5; This aspect of Segal’s work is referenced and was brought to my attention by James
S. Grotstein, M.D., “The Enigmatic Relationship of Creativity to Mental Health and
Psychopathology,” American Journal of PsychodwrapyWol XLVI, no. 3 (July 1992): 405-21.
* Mark Packer, “The Aesthetic Dimension of Ethics and Law: Some Reflections on Harmless
Offense," American Philosophical Quarterly 33, no. 1(January 1996): 57-74.
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deemed unacceptable despite a total lack of evidence against such conduct for
injury caused or rights infringed. Eaton summarizes one of Packer's scenarios
succinctly:
Suppose, he says, we could use DNA painlessly extracted from cows or chickens to
create rib eye steaks or boneless breasts. Since no animal would suffer, vegetarian
arguments against eating meat lose their force. And suppose further, that we could
produce and serve human flesh in the same way. Does all moral offensiveness
disappear? "

The remaining morai' offense, Packer proffers, is aesthetic. That is, whiie no
creature would suffer from the DNA-based creation of human steaks, the general
population wouid iikely reject this scenario on aesthetic grounds.
Packer demonstrates that some evaluative notions used morally are in
fact aesthetic. He offers that “'Revolting', shocking', and even vulgar' are terms
we frequently employ to express an irreducible response to the pure and simple
idea of offensive conduct without any reference to the consequences.”'^
Consider the offense most Westerners take over the consumption of dog as a
deiicacy in parts of Asia. In these Asian cultures, the consumption of dog meat is
neither morally nor aesthetically offensive. As most Westerners eat meat from
cows or chickens without moral concern. Western society's subsequent revolt
over the consumption of dog cannot be moraily justified in terms of genuine harm
to the animai. As with the human DNA steaks, the remaining offense is
aesthetic.
Furthermore, and importantly for the work of art, some harmless behaviors
are judged to be justifiabiy restricted because they violate well-established
aesthetic norms. For example, our ‘rules’ of English grammar are not based
upon the prevention of or protection from harm, but upon established, aesthetic
standards. As Packer points out, “the use of aesthetic vaiues to justify prohibition
is already a well established convention in our moral and legal culture..."^
Packer distinguishes between externai and internal factors of situations, or
Marcia Muelder Eaton, “Aesthetics: The Mother of Ethics?," The Journal ofAestiieUcs and Art
Criticism 58, no. 4{fall 1997): p. 356
“ Packer, p. 61
« Ibid., p. 57
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between genuine harm rendered and mere offense. External factors refer to the
potentiality or probability of harm or injury; internal factors refer to abstract
emotions, such as disgust. Internal factors, as Packer demonstrates, are
frequently deemed adequate to justify behavioral restrictions. By way of
example, he offers the legal case of State vs. Bradbury, in which an elderly man
is challenged for burning his already-dead sister’s body in a furnace. Although
the man played no role in his sister’s death, the state found his action to be
indecent “in light of public sensitivity.” That is, the state deemed his behavior
unacceptable for internal, or aesthetic, reasons. As Packer summarizes,
our intersubjective intuitions say that the non-injurious consumption of human flesh, the
rape and mutilation of robots without consciousness, and even the real life instances of
harmless offense, such as incest between consenting adults, are instances of behavior
that are found unacceptable in virtue of the actions themselves, i.e. for aesthetic
reasons."

Aside from isolated and highly uncommon incidents of death-by-umbrella
and the like, charges of moral wrongdoing levied against art are usually of the
internal variety.'® For example, recent uproar over Chris Ofili’s elephant dung
paintings at the Brooklyn Art Museum was incited not by any harm caused
through the depicted image, but by the aesthetic offense in its corresponding
irreverent medium."® Packer’s writing precedes the Brooklyn Museum scandal
yet prophetically uses an imaginary illustration of a ‘puppy poop painting,’ which
in turn is rejected by the public as scandalously inappropriate.
" Packer, p. 65
" I refer here to an incident Involving a work by the environmental' artist Christo. In October of
1991, Christo Installed several thousand umbrellas along coastlines In California and Japan. The
umbrellas were removed by the artist ahead of schedule after a severe windstorm lifted an
umbrella, which pinned a woman against a boulder and caused her death. See Jan Van der
Marck, “Blue/Yellow Diptych: Christo’s Umbrellas Project,” Art in America, v. 80 (March
1992):100-105. The case Involving Richard Serra’s 77/fed Arc may also be argued as an
externally-lnjurious situation: the sculpture was removed from a public plaza after the plaza’s
users protested that the work interfered with their dally routines and with their happiness. See
Robert Storr, “Tilted Arc’: Enemy of the People?," Art in America v. 73 (September 1985): 90-97.
" While on exhibit at the Brooklyn Art Museum In the fall of 1999, a painting of the Virgin Mary
by British artist Chris Ofill prompted a great deal of media attention. New York’s then-mayor
Rudolph Giuliani called the work an “outrage”, and threatened to eliminate public funding for the
museum If the work were not removed (a threat which did not withstand legal challenge.) See
Donald J. Cosentino, “Hip-hop Assemblage: The Chris Oflll Affair,” African Arts v. 33, no. 1
(spring 2000): 40-57.
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In Packer’s fictitious scenario, the offending medium has been somehow
sterilized so as to render it neither bacterially dangerous nor olfactorially
unpleasant. Packer says that though the excrement has now been stripped of
any possibility for genuine harm, the general public would agree upon a “sound
and convincing” reason for its subsequent rejection: it is disgusting. Indeed, the
Ofili case strengthens Packer's argument. Public outcry began over the dung’s
proximity to the Virgin Mary; the aesthetic offense of the dung applied to a
conceptually revered image furthers its injury, though most would acknowledge
that Ofili is in no way forcing actual harm on the Blessed Virgin. Claims to Ofili’s
Christianity and culture did little to assuage accusations. Hence, cries of
blasphemy and moral imprudence are here as elsewhere tied to aesthetic values.
The argument has been made that internal factors of situations can
influence our external behaviors, or that aesthetic encounters can influence our
physical actions. This is legally referred to as the ‘harm principle’. For instance,
consider Packer’s fictitious scenario of a man who rapes robots. It must be
agreed that the robot, as a non-living entity, cannot suffer any real harm.
However, it may be argued that the man who rapes robots may transfer this
behavior to real women, thus creating the possibility of harm both to real women
and to the ‘moral character’ of the perpetrator. Indeed, Gaut argues that not only
actions and motives, but feelings that do not motivate, are significant. Says
Gaut,
[l]t is inevitable that, however apparently exotic the fictional world, the [situations] shared
between it and the real world will be vast, given the limits on human imagination, the
interests we have in fiction (which include exploring possibilities that reorder the actual
world), and interpretive constraints, which involve drawing on background information
atxîut the real world in the interpretation of fictions.^'

Here as elsewhere, aesthetic values and moral values are not easily
separated. As Packer states, “When we feel very strongly about a moral
principle, we want our position to be taken as an assertion of fact and not merely
as a personal expression of our outrage or indignation.""" Accordingly, as a
society, we exhibit a tendency to “prohibit the offensive behavior... simply
""Gaut, p. 188
Packer, p. 68
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because it Is evil.”^ Without taking the time to methodically separate aesthetic
from moral judgments, our society places legal restrictions on behavior based on
the ‘harm principle’. This can be seen, for Instance In the Helms Adult Radio
Amendment, which limits acceptable broadcast material in order to protect the
young listener’s moral character.®®
Packer does not assert that aesthetic value Is the foundation of moral
value, but merely that the aesthetic sometimes informs morality. Nonetheless,
aesthetic valuations perceived to be moral often constitute “Industrial strength
judgments,” and having shown that aesthetic values often condition our moral
beliefs. Packer asserts that actions or t)ehavlors are often restricted on aesthetic
grounds.®’
This has important Implications for the work of art and artistic practice, as
a perceived moral flaw In a work of art may be sufficient grounds for Its societal
rejection or even legal repression. In this way, the autonomist position’s
argument for the evaluative separation of formal and nonformal factors loses its
validity. That Is, a moral criticism levied against a work of art may be shown,
upon close Investigation, to be aesthetic In nature. This demonstration will not,
however, assure the work’s protection against legal rejection, based upon the
harm principle. Our society Is simply unwilling to evaluatlvely separate moral
from aesthetic concerns In the practical realm. Similarly, the Instrumentalist
position’s argument for the Inclusion of moral factors In aesthetic evaluation
cannot adequately address the challenges facing the work of art In the practical,
societal context.

The Benefits of a Subsumptive Evaluative Approach
The ‘subsumptive’ evaluative position, then, takes Issue with the current
autonomist versus Instrumentalist debate on several key points. First, the
" Packer, p. 63
“ Discussed by Packer, pp. 63-4. The Helms Adult Radio Amendment \Nas signed into law
October 1,1988.
Packer, p. 59
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instrumentalist versus autonomist argument culminates in a disagreement over
what precisely constitutes the aesthetic', and what may thereby be included in
an evaluation of aesthetic worth. Even within the theoretical sphere, as Haskins
has observed, it may prove impossible to find a definition of aesthetic evaluation
so readily agreed upon as the ‘Unified Field Theory’ of physics.®* The
subsumptive position argues that such essentialist claims have little merit in the
practical world, where aesthetic or moral considerations are not easily isolated.
Second, the subsumptive position takes issue with the manner in which
the instrumentalist and autonomist positions debate artistic function. While the
autonomist holds art to be valuable without reference to its instrumental use, and
the instrumentalist holds art to be valuable in terms of moral education, the
subsumptive position acknowledges that neither intrinsic nor instrumental value
will adequately defend art’s continued existence. The subsumptive position is
more closely allied with the instrumentalist than with the autonomist, but
maintains that the instrumentalist position in its current form is unable to
transcend categoric debate and thus cannot adequately address real-world
situations. As art exists exclusively within the human sphere, the subsumptive
position insists that art must necessarily be evaluated and defended with an
inclusive, comprehensive understanding of its societal effects- moral, political,
economic, aesthetic, and otherwise.

' Haskins, p. 3
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Section II: The Subsumptive Position’s Relevance in Contemporary Society
Challenges to Artistic Evaluation in Contemporary Culture
Having established the current debate’s inadequacy when confronted with
real societal challenges, I would next like to address a variety of situations facing
the work of art and artistic practice in contemporary society, and discuss these
issues from a subsumptive point of view. These challenges will be made evident
through an examination of the nature of contemporary visual culture, including
the contemporary era’s fusing of ‘high’ and low’ cultures, blurring of disciplinary
boundaries, and expanding arena for artistic expression. Censorship, the artist/
audience relationship, and artistic responsibility must all be addressed in any
comprehensive evaluation of artistic practice. The subsumptive position’s
relevance will become clearer during the course of this examination.
As discussed earlier. Western society recognizes the value of original
artistic contributions, but simultaneously holds such contributions to certain
evaluative standards. Works of art which do not meet such standards may face
rejection or even legal repression. Certainly, a valid and valuable function of art
is to challenge such societal standards or status quo. Nonetheless, a
subsumptive understanding of art's effects on society and of societal implications
and expectations for the work of art and artistic practice is crucial to any effective
artistic challenge', as well as to any effective evaluation or defense of art.

Censorship and the Societal Defense of Artistic Practice
The most readily apparent opposition to the work of art in contemporary
society comes in the form of censorship. Justifications for the restriction or
censorship of art are almost invariably intertwined with its moral evaluation,
which lends credence to the need for an evaluative position that considers
aesthetic, moral, and other values comprehensively. As discussed earlier, the
moral’ valuations society uses to justify censorship are easily confused with
29
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valuations that are actually aesthetic. Nonetheless, as Nathalie Heinich has
observed, aesthetic evaluation and moral or ethical evaluation are often
diametrically opposed in public perception.®® Mary Deveraux concurs, and offers
that public suspicion of art centers on its perceived moral rather than artistic
failings.®^
In general, it may be said that the majority of our society feels more
comfortable in its ability to evaluate moral value than it does aesthetic value. For
this reason, attempts at artistic censorship are typically addressed toward a work
of art's perceived moral rather than aesthetic failures. That is, while the aesthetic
evaluation of a work of art is most frequently left to art professionals', our
society's mainstream legislative and socially influential bodies feel perfectly
qualified to assess a work's moral value. Notwithstanding, these moral
judgments appear to provide our society with ample justification for the restriction
of a work’s aesthetic qualities as well. Deveraux summarizes this observation as
such:
The increasing public suspicion of, and perhaps even hostility towards, art centers on the
moral rather than artistic failings of contemporary art. So, in the Mapplethorpe
controversy, public outrage centered not on the question of artistic value (that question
being largely left to artworld ‘experts’) but on whether the funded art was obscene (the
assumption being that obscene art can’t have been worth the money the taxpayers ‘paid
for it’.®

Once again, it can be observed that our society intermingles its moral and
aesthetic evaluations to the extent that the two cannot be practically separated.
Except in rare instances, proponents of art will be unable to persuade the
majority of society that its moral judgments are actually aesthetic, and even less
able to demonstrate that autonomy should be granted to these aesthetic values.
As Michael Brenson has observed, “we live in a time when any view of the artist
as a heroic outsider and any separation of the artist and society are being
severely challenged by the Left, and where the idea of the artist's moral authority
® Nathalie Heinich, “Framing the Bullfight; Aesthetics Versus Ethics,” The British Joumai of
Aesthetics 33, no. 1(January 1993): 52-58.
® Mary Deveraux, “Protected Space: Politics, Censorship, and the Arts, ” The Joumal of
Aesffietics and Art Criticism 55, no. 3(summer 2000): 219-25.
® Ibid., p. 209
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is a joke to the Right.”*
Lynne Warren, the Director of the Museum of Contemporary Art in
Chicago in 1989, noted the difficulty artists and art ‘professionals’ encounter in
attempting to persuade the general public of art's omniscient contributions to our
moral and aesthetic culture:
Did the arts community really believe It could ‘reach a broader audience' without having
to stop and think maybe that broader audience wouldn’t really know what to do with those
often morally bankrupt, cynical, obscure, self-referential, and downright self-indulgent
products contemporary artists are spewing forth?... Or that a conservative Christian will
stop himself and say, "No, I wont judge Mr. Serrano’s Piss Chnsf until I’ve understood It
In context.’ The arts community has often been accused of being morally lax and socially
arrogant; It seems the chickens are finally coming home to roost.”

In light of these observations, it appears critical that proponents of art- artists,
critics, and aesthetes- subsumptively understand the nature of the charges levied
against art as well as its points of defense.
Censorship results from and is backed judicially based on the earlier
discussed 'harm principle’- that is, that a negative moral value found in a work of
art may have a negative impact upon the ‘moral character" of either the artist or
viewer. This censorship may be legislated, as was the case with the Helms Adult
Radio Amendment, or may be voluntarily initiated through groupings of likeminded individuals, as was the Los Angeles Police Department’s suggested
boycott of Ice-T’s Cop Killer.^
The autonomist position, we may recall, refutes the harm principle through
the assertion that the aesthetic value found in a work of art is distinct from its
moral and other values, but this assertion does not protect the work of art from its
subsequent rejection on moral grounds. Packer has observed that our society
accepts “probable damage to the moral character of the perpetrators” as an
acceptable reason for the regulation or condemnation of a given behavior- in this
“ Michael Brenson, “Where Do We Go from Here?: Securing A Place for the Artist in Society,” in
The Artist In Society, ed. Carol Becker and Ann Wiens. (Chicago: New Art Examiner Press,
1995), p. 73
” Lynne Warren, director of the Museum of Contemporary Art in Chicago, speaking on
censorship in “Against Intimidation,” New Art Examiner, October 1989 p.27, quoted and referred
to by Heartney, p. 44- 45
“ This scenario is noted and discussed in greater detail by Deveraux, p. 213
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case, either artistic creation or observation.” He does note that this argument is
losing force in the courts in favor of personal autonomy, a point to which I shall
return briefly.
The notion that art can have a tangible effect on moral character is deeply
rooted within our culture.” As such, aesthetic autonomy is difficult to enforce.
Deveraux has noted that the National Endowment for the Arts’ conservative
opponents are chiefly concerned not with art’s aesthetic merits but with art as a
moral or educational vehicle. For this reason, any effective evaluation of art must
take into consideration its practical effects, and defend it both against and from
within its likely societal valuations.
Such an approach does present difficulties or dangers for the work of art
and for artistic practice; these, too, must t>e acknowledged and subsumptively
understood. First, it is important that the proponent of art not surrender
perfunctorily to the values’ of the oppositional body. As Deborah Haynes has
duly noted, there exists a problem in limiting ethics or morality to family values.’®’
As members of society, proponents of art must claim a role in determining that
society’s moral’ values.
Second, as Deveraux has stated, “a political conception of art risks
making artists and their works dependent on popular opinion and the whims of
political fashion.”®® While a political conception of art’ does indeed open it to
public evaluation, to isolate art as an exclusive and autonomous realm renders it
impotent. Furthermore, as discussed above, it is likely impossible to protect art
as an autonomous realm of practice.

It is necessary to subject art to ‘political’

evaluation in order to consider the full range of its effects and limitations in the
societal context. Once again, however, it is important to recall that the proponent
of art is an active participant in this political dialogue.
Packer, p. 59
" Consider St. Thomas Aquinas' assertion that art can have both positive and negative effects
on moral life, among other examples.
*’ Deborah J. Haynes, “On the Need for Ethical Aesthetics: or. Where I Stand Between NeoLuddites and Cyberians," Art Joumal 56, no. 3(fall 1997): 75-82, p. 75
“ Deveraux, p. 213
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The censorial restrictions our society places on art notwithstanding,
society does also possess an intangible understanding of art’s unique character
both within and outside of moral or political evaluation. For this reason, art
retains a role in societal dialogue. As Deveraux has said, ‘The demand for
special protections [for art] rests on the intuition that art is not just any kind of
expression- in burning all the existing copies of The Grapes of Wrath we lose
more than just Steinbeck’s opinions.”®
Similarly, it can be argued that a society which allows artists and others to
explore even its negative aspects is healthier than one which sets rigid guidelines
for acceptable artistic inquiry.® Freedom of speech and expression is a
foundational tenet of American culture; during the Cold War, artistic freedom was
used to demonstrate American superiority over repressive totalitarian societies.®
That as a society, Americans are conflicted over the degree of inquisitive latitude
which should be granted to art demonstrates that art is simultaneously valued
and mistrusted. Understanding the reasons behind these values and fears
allows the proponent of art to establish a more secure place for art in society and
opens the door for the creation of art which more successfully accomplishes its
intended moral, political, and aesthetic effects.
A subsumptive approach to artistic evaluation acknowledges that public or
societal censorship does pose a threat to art’s sovereign existence, but contends
that an understanding of societal motives will benefit art both creatively and
evaluatlvely. Of artistic sovereignty, Kathy Acker has said “innocence will soon
be dead”; the artist who chooses to work in ways which do not support the status
quo must at minimum be able to make clear the reasons for the things she
does.® A subsumptive understanding of art’s societal effects and implications
® Deveraux, p. 214
** A form of tills argument is taken up by Danny Goldberg, “Media Morality,” Tikkun 15, no. 6:
5-6.
* See Max Kozloff, “American Painting During the Cold War,” and Eva Cockcroft, “Abstract
Expressionism, Weapon of the Cold War,” both found in Pollock and After: The Critical Debate,
edited by Francis Frascina (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1985.)
“ Kathy Acker, “Proposition One,” in The Artist in Society, ed. Carol Becker and Ann Wiens
(Chicago: New Art Examiner Press, 1995), p. 44
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enables the artist or evaluator to defend art's function or lack of function, moral
values or lack of moral values.

Artistic Value and Societal Significance
As Mark Packer earlier suggested, censorship based on the harm
principle is losing ground in the courts to the notion of personal autonomy.' That
is, our society is currently experiencing a conflict between protecting individuals
from moral or physical harm and upholding the individual’s ‘right’ to selffulfillment. Self-fulfillment is a pervasive notion in contemporary culture, affecting
all disciplines, and creating some interesting and important implications for art
and artistic evaluation or defense. As such, a closer investigation of personal
autonomy or self-fulfillment is warranted.
Charles Taylor has discussed this trend in contemporary society at length;
he refers to self-fulfillment in terms of authenticity.’^ The moral ideal behind
self-fulfillment, says Taylor, is “being true to oneself”, or being ‘authentic.’®® He
further distinguishes between two forms of authenticity as experienced in our
society; both forms place an emphasis on the individual, but only one
acknowledges the individual’s inseparable societal role. To pursue the ideal of
authenticity is to pursue self-truth, or a fulfillment of self-potential. The danger in
such a pursuit, Taylor warns, is an excessive centering on the self, at the
expense of those around us. Taylor refers to this excessive self-centeredness as
deviant’ authenticity, characterized by a narcissism which causes us to
instrumentalize everything and everyone with whom we have contact.®® That is,
in the deviant’ pursuit of self-fulfillment, we begin to view all else in our lives
solely in terms of the potential advancement of our own situations. More
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Auttienticlty. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991)
“ Ibid., p. 15
" It is Important to note that the term ‘deviant’ , as used by Taylor, does not refer to ‘degeneracy’
or to values or practices which deviate from societal norms, but rather refers to an attempt at selffulfillment (or authentidt/} which cannot ultimately be satisfied. That is, this attempt deviates’
from an attainable (or genuine ) form of self-fulfillment which is of benefit to both the individual
and society.
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egregious still, Taylor submits, is that with this deviant form of authenticity, we
feel compelled to forsake the needs of others if they come at any expense to our
own self-fulfillment. Families, communities, and friendships lose their value as
we lose the ‘moral force’ of our culture.
In this position, says Taylor, a culture of ‘moral subjectivism’ emerges.
We begin to feel that as we would not want our own self-fulfillment to be stunted,
we cannot impose any sanctions against the values of another; this is at the root
of the judicially-upheld personal autonomy discussed by Packer. According to
this position, no one has the right to criticize another’s values, as ‘value’ must be
a subjective notion. We feel that things are only as important as we, as
individuals, deem them to be, and similarly that by virtue of our own personal
designations of importance, things become inherently worthwhile.
Taylor points out, however, that our own feelings and designations cannot
assign genuine significance. Indeed, to give equal importance to all facets of
human experience according to the whims of the individual Is to relegate all of life
to the status of triviality. As Taylor observes, “I couldn’t just decide that the most
significant action is wiggling my toes in warm mud.”^ If as a society, we lose any
collective understanding of importance or significance, then we also lose all
opportunity for meaningful discussion. Tayior notes that a general feature of
human life, and thus of our selves, is its fundamentally dialogical nature. Again,
he explains;
\Aftien we come to understand wtiat it is to define ourselves, to determine in what our
originality consists, we see that we have to take as background some sense of what is
significant. Defining myself means finding what is significant in my difference from
others. I may be the only person with exactly 3,732 hairs on my head, or be exactly the
same height as some tree on the Siberian plain, but so what? If I begin to say that I
define myself by my ability to articulate important truths, or play the Hammerklavier like
no one else, or revive the tradition of my ancestors, then we are in the domain of
recognizable self-definitions.''

Genuine understanding of ourselves requires an understanding of our
histories, backgrounds, and cultural values. We cannot define ourselves as
™Taylor, p. 36
" Ibid., p. 35-6
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unique individuals withot reference to societal standards. Furthermore, we
cannot attain genuine self-fulfillment as individuals at the expense of the society
we collectively form. True individual authenticity cannot be attained at society's
expense, because we as individuals form society; when we inflict societal harm,
we similarly harm ourselves as individuals. In order to understand what makes
us unique as individuals, we must understand what our society values, and how
we as individuals reflect or challenge those values.
Taylor’s second, or genuine' form of authenticity thus takes into account
the health of the body politic, and acknowledges the existence and importance of
horizons of significance,' or societal standards of importance and worth.
Authenticity cannot be defended in ways which collapse these horizons.^
According to Taylor, authenticity Involves: (a) creation, construction, and
creativity; (b) originality, and (c) frequently, opposition to social norms, while
simultaneously authenticity requires, (a) openness to the horizons of significance,
and (b) self-definition in dialogue. That is, genuine self-fulfillment involves
creativity and originality which may frequently be at odds with societal standards,
but requires that the individual maintain an understanding of what these
standards, or horizons of significance, involve. These demands, he
acknowledges, may frequently be in tension with one another.
Art, then, becomes a place where authenticity can thrive. Taylor holds the
artist up as the paradigm agent of self-definition, for the artist by definition fulfills
the above-stated demands of authenticity. If authenticity, as Taylor explains it,
brings deep satisfaction through the fulfillment of self-potential in accordance with
the needs of societal health, then the artist plays an important role as an agent of
that societal transformation.
The requirements of authenticity, however, deserve some further
examination in terms of their implications for the artist. First, genuine authenticity
requires openness to the horizons of significance, or societal standards of what is
important. This does not require that the individual (in this case, the artist)
” For ease of use, from this point forward I will refer to Tabor’s genuine form of authenticity as
simply ‘authenticity’, and I will denote the deviant form as deviant authenticity.’
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submit to or wholly agree with what society deems significant; indeed, Taylor
informs us that authenticity frequently involves opposition to social norms.
Rather, this requirement specifies that in order to avoid triviality, the artist must
be aware of current societal expectations, and may challenge these expectations
only from within this societal framework. That is, the artist (or critic) must not rest
upon claims of art's subjectivity, but must defend his choices in relation to the
horizons of significance.
Second, authenticity requires self-definition in dialogue; again, this cannot
be attained autonomously. That is, the artist may not attain self-fulfillment
without engaging in a dialogue with other members of society, in an effort to
establish his or her individuality. The necessity of a subsumptive understanding
of art’s effects and implications in society is thus, once again, made manifest.
As Taylor has demonstrated, however, the deviant form of authenticity
present in our culture has caused a fragmentation of society through our
instrumentalization of one another. That is, as individuals have pursued their
own self-fulfillment without regard for their relational effects, our society has
become fractured into a myriad of specialized interests. Taylor discusses the
accompanying disregard for the horizons of significance in terms of moral
subjectivism’ or soft relativism’; within the art profession this same concept is
frequently referred to as pluralism’.
Pluralism in artistic evaluation retains the notion that one cannot criticize
another’s values. This is frequently discussed in terms of art’s subjectivity. One
frequently hears, especially outside of the art profession and particularly in
reference to aesthetic value, that art cannot be decisively deemed good or bad,
due to its subjective nature. Art, according to this position, is all a matter of
preference. Pluralism thus absorbs all argument; in art, as in life, total autonomy
brings with it merely irrelevance. Hal Foster explains the situation as such;
[Pluralism] grants a kind of equivalence; art of many sorts is made to seem more or less
equal- equally (un)important. Art t)ecomes an arena not of dialectical dialogue but of
vested interests, of licensed sects: in lieu of culture we have cults. The result is an
eccentricity that leads, in art as in politics, to a new conformity: pluralism as an
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institution.^

The total freedom of art, says Foster, brings with it the end of art’s significance.
As such, a ‘pluralistic’ evaluative position- that is, an approach to the evaluation
of art which deems all values to be subjective and relative- effectively denies art’s
societal significance.
Says Taylor, authenticity is clearly self-referential, but its content need not
be. A subsumptive approach to the evaluation of art must acknowledge that the
creation and existence of art necessarily has practical, societal implications, and
must consider the effects generated by a work of art as a valid component of its
evaluation. This sort of evaluation both considers and fulfills the requirements of
authenticity and thereby encourages the development of art works which can be
defended in terms of societal benefit.

The Artist/ Audience Relationship & Artistic Responsibility
We see then that the artist, by virtue of creativity, construction, originality,
and diaiogical self-definition, is ideally suited to perform as an agent of genuine
authenticity, operating always with a recognition of our society’s background
horizons of significance. It is also apparent that art is susceptible to the same
dangers that befall the rest of society through deviant' authenticity, namely to
fragmentation and pluralism.
Eleanor Heartney, like Taylor, has remarked that art provides both the
artist and the audience with a place where authenticity can thrive.^" She
observes a current problem, however, as such:
Only if there is a way of achieving authenticity within society can genuine [authentic]
experience tie a real possibility. The problem is that art in the modem era has defined
itself as a vehicle of self-expression that is meaningful only to the degree that it
expresses a private vision.’*

As Taylor has illustrated, there can be no genuine personal fulfillment without a
|
' Hal
Foster, Recodings. (Seattle: Bay Press, 1985), p. 15
Eleanor Heartney, Critical Condition: American Culture at the Crossroads. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997.), p. 13
^* Ibid., p. 19
73

74 I
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corresponding societal fulfillment, rooted in fluid yet ever-present horizons of
significance. The dominant culture of today, however, assumes a deviant form
which lauds the individual at the exclusion of societal health. Similarly, artistic
practice and evaluation has frequently been concerned with individual
achievement and has neglected to consider societal effects. As Heartney claims,
any casual survey of the contents of galleries and contemporary art museums reveals
that the vast majority of work on display has less to do with the expression of eternal or
difficult truths than it does with fitting into the categories of high-priced collectiljles or light
entertainment. For decades, the art world proper has resolutely separated itself from any
sense of responsibility toward the social world, which makes the humanistic terms with
which it defends itself now more than a little suspect.”

Taylor warns us that authenticity, like all other forms of freedom, requires
a corresponding individual responsibility; of benefit, however, is that a society is
made more self-responsible through the development of this type of culture.^
The artist, acting as agent of authenticity, must then reclaim responsibility for the
effects and implications of his art in societal terms. This disclosed relationship
between the artist and societal audience strengthens the work of art by restoring
its authentic significance and strengthens the evaluative defense of art’s societal
worth.
An important function of art, and responsibility of the artist, is thus the
contribution to public discourse. As we have seen, however, the deviant form of
authenticity present in our culture has caused a fragmentation of society through
our instrumentalization of one another- or, through our tendency to value in
others only those things which affirm our own individual choices. As individuals
seek self-fulfillment without regard for our shared history, allegiances are
redivided or eliminated. That is, as individuals seek to affirm their distinguishing
characteristics, geographic communities lose their unifying character, and
multifarious political groupings emerge in the place of ‘community.’ In some
instances, these groups are formed around a shared value; in others, groups
may deveiop based on a shared circumstance. As John McHale has explained,
T h e inhabitant of any of the world's large cities- London, Tokyo, Paris, New
” Heartney, p. 43
^ Taylor, p. 77
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York- is more likely to find himself ‘at home’ in any of them, than in the rural parts
of his own country; the international cultural milieu that sustains him will be more
evident.”™ Similarly, a homosexual man living in Iowa may consider his
community" to consist of other homosexuals living many miles away in every
direction, rather than of his immediate neighbors.
Increasingly, the individual pursuing this deviant authenticity is unable to
claim allegiance with a single societal faction. To which singular community’
would a single, Islamic, immigrant mother with multiple sclerosis, by way of
example, claim allegiance? The division of communities’ along political lines
makes Increasingly unlikely the possibility of large groups who share common
values.
The potential for dialogue between the artist and the public’ is thus made
increasingly difficult, as individual members of our society are increasingly loath
to define themselves collectively as a ‘public’. This presents a difficult dilemma
for the artist as well as for the art evaluator. As we have seen, art cannot attain
genuine significance merely through the artist or critic’s designation of such
merit; in order to avoid triviality, art must be created and considered against the
background of the horizons of significance. However, these horizons have grown
increasingly difficult to decipher, as society has fractured into infinite factions with
a decreasing number valuative ties between them.
Art frequently moves between the public and the private realms, though it
is often criticized for doing so. The artist is attacked for politicizing’ private
matters such as sexuality and family dynamic. This is a difficult position, for the
artist will be in continuous opposition to some faction of society.
Friedrich Engels offered us the model of the artist as a cultural worker’
rather than image or object producer; the subsumptive position will adhere to that
model. The realm of the cultural worker includes an expanded knowledge of
popular culture, street art, media, science, and technology.™ Engels’ cultural
” John McHale, T h e Plastic Parthenon," in Pop Art Redefined, ed. John Russell and Suzi
Gabllk. (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), p. 48
™Henry Giroux, “Borderline Artists, Cultural Workers, and the Crisis of Democracy.” in The Artist
in Society, ed. Carol Becker and Ann Wiens. (Chicago: New Art Examiner Press, 1995) p. 10
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worker provides an effective model for the subsumptive position’s artist or critic,
because the cultural worker must operate with a constant and simultaneous
awareness and consideration of art's aesthetic, formal, contextual, Instrumental,
and dialogical properties and possibilities.
Henry Giroux claims that the most provocative contemporary art Is that
which Is sited at ‘crossings’ of the various realms of the cultural worker, for
example, the art Institution and the political economy, or sexuality and social life.
Performance artist Guillermo Gomez-Pena has similarly coined tiie term border
Intellectual' to apply to the artist as cultural worker; Giroux explains It as such;
If the universal intellectual speaks for everyone, and the specific intellectual is wedded to
serving the narrow interests of distinct cultural and social formations, the border
intellectual travels within and across communities of difference, working in collatxjration
with diverse groups and occupying many sites of resistance while simultaneously defying
the specialized, parochial knowledge of the individual specialist, sage, or master
ideologue. As border intellectuals, cultural workers can articulate and negotiate different
struggles as part of a broader effort to secure social justice, economic equality, and
human rights vwthin and across regional, national, and glol>al spheres.”

Foster echoes this in his call for an art which is not defined by either its formal or
moral properties, but rather “seeks affiliations with otiier practices,” in the culture
industry and elsewhere- in philosophy, science, and religion. “As public
Intellectuals,” says Giroux, “we must define ourselves not merely as marginal,
avant-garde figures, professionals, or academics acting alone, but as critical
citizens whose collective knovWedge and actions presuppose specific visions of
public life, community, and moral accountability.”®’

The State of Contemporary Visual Culture
Engels’ ‘cultural worker’ and Gdmez-Peha’s border intellectual’
acknowledge both the need for artistic practice which achieves its significance
within the societal horizons of significance as well as the difficulty in delineating a
singular set of cultural horizons. The artist as border intellectual navigates this
apparent quandary through the subsumptive recognition of art’s effects and
“ Giroux, p. 12
«’ Ibid., p 13
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implications- both potential and actual- within an expanded conception of visual
or artistic culture.
Accompanying the fragmentation of our society has emerged a difficulty in
discerning the boundaries between disciplines. That is, just as individuals have
found it increasingly difficult to define themselves witfiin a singular community,
disciplinary boundaries between art, philosophy, religion, economics, and politics
have become blurred. The implications of this for the visual artist are significant;
the artist may now legitimately- or indeed may bear a responsibility to- operate
not only within the traditional artistic sphere, but within the whole of our society.
This blurring of boundaries has made it necessary for the artist or critic as border
intellectual to recognize several accompanying phenomena, which include the
amalgamation of high' and ‘low’ cultures, the melding of lin e ’ and ‘media’ arts,
and the correlative expansion of visual culture.
Henry Giroux has acknowledged that in order to effectively navigate
among the various possible realms of artistic creation, evaluation, and
participation, the border intellectual must expand her social knowledge to include
both traditionally high’ and ‘low’ cultural forms. The ‘high’ art forms include what
Lawrence Alloway has dubbed “Renaissance-based” ideas of artistic valuepainting, sculpture, theatre, dance-, while ‘low’ art includes kitsch, video games,
and mass media. It is critical that the border intellectual be aware of the
disparate forms of and possibilities for information dissemination and visual
practice which occur within popular culture.
In Danny Goldberg’s essay “Media Morality,” he argues that if we are
trying to build a society which adequately addresses the lives of individuals, we
cannot ignore pop’ culture.® That is, in order for the artist to participate in the
public dialogue required of genuine authenticity and genuine artistic function, the
artist as border intellectual must acknowledge and operate within the framework
of the cultural media most familiar to this public’. Giroux calls pop culture “a
territory where pleasure, knowledge, and desire circulate in close proximity to the
life of the streets,” to include “comics, pinball machines, restricted codes, [and]
“ Goldberg, p. 6
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Visual excesses...”®*
The primary vehicle of pop culture, certainly, is mass media. Alloway has
observed that
Acceptance of the mass media entails a shift in our notion of what culture is. Instead of
reserving the word for the highest artifacts and the noblest thoughts of history’s top ten, it
needs to be used more widely as the description of ‘what a society does.

TTie advent of new technologies have enabled the expansion of mass media
forms to inhabit nearly every aspect of our daily lives- from print media at the
breakfast table, broadcast media in our cars, and satellite television in school
classrooms, to online video games, internet chat rooms accessed through public
libraries, and moving billboards and LED signs in civic spaces. Hearttiey says
this media saturation forms a basic postmodern tenet: our understanding of the
world is based first and foremost on mediated images.®®
For the artist, this fusing of high and low cultures and fine and media arts
has had the important effect of expanding the range and scope of visual culture.
Several accompanying implications are worthy of note. First, while the
proliferation of media spaces may widen tiie available avenues for artistic
practice, the actual result has most frequently been the nearly ubiquitous
expansion of advertising. Foster has referred to the “primacy of the image as a
form of capital,” and Herbert Schiller has noted that the media-informational
sphere has been nearly entirely appropriated for marketing.®® Bob Stein, founder
of the media-development companies Voyageur and Night Kitchen, Inc., has said
the following concerning advertising’s appropriation of mass media and the
effects of this situation on the artist:
The only thing really inevitable is that capital will seek every advantage it can. Big
companies are going to use all the ways they can to deliver consumers to advertisers, to
seli you their products and ideas; they’re going to use new technoiogies every way they
can, to do what they need to do, which is to create more capital. ArxJ the artist can t>e
“ Giroux, p. 6
“ Lawrence Alloway, T h e Long Front of Culture,” in Pop Art Redefined, ed. John Russell and
Suzi Gabiik. (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1969), p. 41
“ Heartney, Critical Condition, p. 31
" Herbert I. Schiiler, “Media, Technology, and the Market: The Interacting Dynamic,” in Culture
on the Brink: Ideologies of Technology, ed. Gretchen Bender and Timottiy Druckrey. (Seattfe: Bay
Press, 1994)
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yoked to that task quite easily through criteria for access to markets and the means to
create."

Goldman has observed, however, that capitalism- in the form of
advertising- will promote and exploit, but does not originate, popular culture. As
evidence, he refers to new developments in popular music, noting that 15 years
ago, the big record companies did not like rap music, and it was not used to sell
shoes, soft drinks, and movie tickets. While advertising may dominate the
media-informational sphere, it competes with art only for space and attention.
The artist as border inteiiectuai must be subsumptiveiy aware of the
potential generated through the expansion of visual culture, as well as of the
current ends to which this potential is used. A subsumptive understanding of
art’s effects and potential within this culture will similarly allow the artist or
evaiuator to create and promote artistic practices which are both effective
despite increased visual competition and distinguishable within the blurred artistic
definitions which this culture promotes.
Second, the development of a media-saturated culture has produced a
generation of individuals whose primary means of accessing the world is through,
as Heartney has said, “mediated images.” In order for the artist to effectiveiy
engage in the earlier-specified pubiic dialogue, it is important that he understand
the means through which this public communicates, and subsumptively consider
these factors in any creation or evaiuation of art. As Alloway has phrased this,
“Any lessons in consumption or in style must occur inside the pattern of
entertainment and not weigh it down like a pigeon with The Naked and the Dead
tied to its leg.”*

Public dialogue requires a subsumptive understanding of the

languages spoken by that public.
The expansion of visual culture to include both traditional and newly
emergent visual forms has had some noteworthy effects on the development of
new art, and has similarly created some new contextual situations for our
" Robert Stein, “We Could Be Better Ancestors Than This: Ethics and First Principles for the Art
of the Digital Age,” in The Digital Dialecte, ed. Peter Lunenfeld. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1999), p. 203
** Alloway, p. 42
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historically-revered works. This recontextualization can be seen in the profligate
postcard-kitsch variants of the Mona Lisa or American Gothic-, in the use of once
politically-charged art to sell consumer products, as with the use of Keith Haring s
dancing figures to sell minivans; and in the expanding use of artistic works as
consumable, status-enhancing corporate goods, as with the purchase of Leon
Golub’s paintings of torture scenes by the Saatchi collection.® These new uses
require new critical evaluation as well, and a subsumptive evaluative approach
will necessarily consider not only ttie original work, but also the newly emergent
manner of instrumental use in any determination of value.
This appropriation of historical works has made its way into the creation of
new art, as well. Contemporary artists, in the manner of advertising, have
frequently borrowed’ elements of historical works or even the old work in its
entirety.® Foster has charged that while modern art frequently borrowed and
deconstructed historical forms, postmodern art often merely borrows- without
regard for context or intention. Postmodern references to historical examples, he
says, “do not function formally so much as they serve as ‘tokens’ of specific
traditions.”®’
Foster’s argument holds that the historical appropriation sometimes found
in contemporary art is too often present only for superficial reasons; that is, the
reference has no bearing on the new work. Foster calls this a resolution of the
new work in ‘pastiche’, and says “in the absence of any other relevance or
legitimacy, the historical references in this art serve as a form of sanction.”® The
charge, then, is that these works possess no genuine significance and have
opened no new arenas for public discourse. Heartney agrees, and offers that
The strength of appropriation is that it challenges the blind adherence to modernism's
progressive version of history. Its weakness is its failure to offer any alternative to the
•* This latter example is discussed by Heartney, pp. 15-17
“ Consider Sherrie Levine’s controversial ‘works’ of the 1980s, in which Levine retitled
unretouched, existing works by famous photographers and exhibited them as her own. A
photograph by Walker Evans, for instance, became Levine’s ‘After Walker Evans. ’ See Eleanor
Heartney, Postmodernism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.), pp. 36-40.
Foster, p 28
“ Ibid., p 42
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rule of entropy.®

A subsumptive approach to the creation or evaluation of new art, following
Taylor’s model for genuine authenticity, acknowledges that a critical function of
art and of the artist is to engage in public discourse. Once again, works of art
which cannot be defined in relation to society, or to the horizons of significance,
cannot achieve any real societal significance.
In an effort to engage the public in this artistic dialogue more effectively,
contemporary artists in recent years have attempted, through a variety of means,
to reevaluate the designations and locations of ‘art’. These efforts have included
‘public art projects’ which involve the non-arts community in the creation of large
scale art pieces, the introduction of works of art to nontraditional spaces where
the works might engage a new audience, and the advent of ‘performance’ and
conceptual’ art, which defy allegiance to the object in an effort to engage the
audience more directly and experientially.
The subsumptive position does not offer an edict in the style of modernist
theory and therefore does not make any claims regarding the most appropriate
and effective means of artistic practice. Rather, the subsumptive position insists
that the creation, evaluation, and defense of art will be improved through a
subsumptive understanding of the effects and implications of both societal
concerns on the work of art and of the work of art on society.

Heartney, p. 21
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Conclusion
While the debate between the autonomist and instrumentalist evaluative
positions has consumed a good deal of the critical art community’s time and
energy, its assertions are grounded in theory alone and cannot make the
transition to the practical world. That is, the debate over whether moral or ethical
considerations should be included in an evaluation of aesthetic value does not
adequately address the practical situations facing tiie work of art and artistic
practice within society.
Furthermore, it may be shown that neither instrumental nor intrinsic value
alone will adequately defend art’s continued role in society. Distinctions between
aesthetic and moral or other values are often difficult to determine in the
practical, societal context, and in order to assure and defend the value ascribed
to art by both the autonomist and instrumentalist positions, it is necessary to
transcend the theoretical debate and address the societal situations faced by art.
To do so requires a subsumptive understanding of art’s instrumental, aesthetic,
cognitive and other values and of the implications and effects these values create
in society.
The subsumptive position achieves its validity through an examination of
various actual situations facing the work of art and artistic practice, and through
the demonstration that a comprehensive- or subsumptive- understanding and
consideration of artistic and societal values will strengthen artistic creation and
evaluation. The reasons for which art is censored or restricted in our society are
complex and frequently dimly understood by that society; artistic practice
requires a subsumptive understanding of those reasons in order to successfully
navigate within the physical world.
As art exists exclusively within the societal realm, it can only achieve
genuine significance within the framework of that society’s values; these values
are, nonetheless, open to influence and are effectively challenged by the work of
art engaged in a societal discourse. A subsumptive understanding of the values
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already possessed by society- aesthetic, moral, and otherwise- and of the work
of art's effects on these values, is essential to a fruitful public dialogue and
thereby to the success of the work of art.
Finally, as our society’s definitions of "culture" have expanded, so too has
the realm for artistic practice. In order for art to effectively exist within this
expanded culture, it is necessary that the artist or evaluator consider the
languages and values of this culture, and subsumptively assess art’s values and
effects accordingly.
The subsumptive position holds that art’s moral, ethical, political,
economic, and status values- as well as aesthetic value- must be considered in
composite as valid and necessary components of art and artistic practice. For
the artist, a subsumptive understanding of these values and their practical effects
will facilitate stronger works of art, which are valuable within the horizons of
significance, and are societally defensible as such.
For the critic or art evaluator, a subsumptive approach to artistic
evaluation will facilitate a more comprehensive and aœurate assessment of a
work of art’s merits and faults in terms of genuine or authentic societal and
aesthetic significance, and will strengthen and legitimize a defense or
devaluation of the work. The subsumptive evaluation of art will similarly
encourage the development of stronger art works in terms of genuine
significance, which contribute effectively to a public dialogue, and may
accordingly strengthen society.
Rattier than establish a directive for the manner of artistic creation, the
subsumptive position encourages an approach to artistic creation and evaluation
which is aware of art’s potential and real effects, and maintains an awareness of
these effects within the course of artistic practice.
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